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I
INTRODUCTION

The three articles by Abbott, Atwood, and Ordover illustrate the
importance of combining economic, political, and legal analyses in
considering issues of international economic relationships and also the
difficulties inherent in doing so. The international dimension to such issues
often complicates not only the analysis of the economic effects of alternative
legal and political strategies, but also the enforceability of such strategies, as
well as the types of rules upon which agreement might be reached. The
widely differing conclusions drawn by Atwood and Ordover about the most
desirable strategy for applying U.S. antitrust laws against cartel-type behavior
abroad illustrate the difficulties in successfully combining these
considerations. Both authors clearly emphasize, as does Abbott, that in a
world characterized by international rivalry as well as cooperation among
sovereign governments, neither economic nor legal theory by itself provides a
sufficient guide for analysis. Both the lawyer, Atwood, and the economist,
Ordover, indicate concerns with economic effects and with issues of
enforceability, but they do not carry through their analysis of the balancing of
these considerations in a fully consistent manner.
II
THE DIFFICULTIES OF ENFORCING ANTITRUST STATUTES ABROAD

Ordover's discussion of the ways in which U.S. economic interests would
be influenced by different types of industrial policies abroad is interesting.
Nevertheless, Professor Wood's skepticism in her comments about the
practicality of distinguishing between different policies as a basis for legal
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determinations seems well-founded.' Equally important is the issue of
whether U.S. antitrust law findings could be effectively enforced against
actions taken abroad by foreign firms, and even if so, would this be the most
effective way to try to deal with such conflicts.
Ordover acknowledges the impossibility of suing foreign governments in
their sovereign capacity,2 but goes on to argue that while "very few
advantages will result from an aggressive exercise of jurisdiction in cases
alleging violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act ... claiming jurisdiction in
section 1 cases promises clear economic benefits." 3 He argues that by
"aggressively using section 1 ... we might encourage foreign governments to
rebate the overcharge and benefit U.S. consumers." 4 If the decisions of the
courts of the United States could be effectively enforced and the only concern
was with what is economically desirable from the standpoint of the United
States, then Ordover's comments on section 1 actions would be very
persuasive. However, such backing of the American court's findings by the
government of the country where the cartel is located seems unlikely,
especially where the foreign government was instrumental in setting up the
cartel in the first place. As is documented in the appendix to this comment, a
wide range of sanctions against foreign firms exist under U.S. law.
Unfortunately, the options which can have the strongest effects when taken
unilaterally impose substantial direct costs on the U.S. economy or run the
serious risk of inducing retaliation abroad. For example, where the cartel
members have assets in the United States, these can be frozen and used to pay
assessed fines and damages. Freezing assets and assessing fines and damages
are extremely strong acts, however, which should not be undertaken without
careful consideration of the likely repercussions. Evaluating the appropriate
response is a task for which the executive branch is far better equipped than
5
the judiciary.
The most general, clearly enforceable sanction is to forbid sales to the
United States by the foreign firms concerned, but that would only add to the
costs to the U.S. economy of the original restrictions in supply. As Ordover
discusses, there is an asymmetry in our ability through national actions to
combat inappropriately priced imports. 6 It is easy to place duties on items
priced too low and thus increase the price. Where prices are too high,
however, price correction would require the home government to subsidize
7
imports, increasing profits for the foreign producers of the overpriced goods.
This is not an attractive option. Policies should attempt to lower the foreign
1.
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monopoly price instead. How best to do this is a complicated issue and the
best strategy may vary on a case-by-case basis. Alternatives include imposing
a tariff to lower the monopoly's profit-maximizing price, direct bargaining,
and threatening retaliation. Where the foreign monopoly price is due to a
cartel, doing nothing or merely adopting non-confrontational measures to
reduce the price at which foreigners can sell a given amount to the domestic
market may be the best strategy. The rationale for such an approach would be
to help undermine the cohesion of the cartel by avoiding political actions,
which would increase cartel solidarity, while increasing the market pressures
on the cartel in hopes of stimulating greater free riding and ultimately a
breakdown of the cartel. Optimal policy strategies which take the cartel as a
given can differ quite substantially from those designed to break the cartel. 8
III
ENFORCEABILITY AND THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT

NEGOTIATIONS

Prosecution will seldom be the best way to influence the behavior of
foreign governments. Atwood correctly observes that "disputes over the
activities of government sanctioned export cartels should be addressed on a
government-to-government basis rather than through litigation in national
courts under national rules." 9 Successful "dispute settlement" activities

require the careful balancing of a wide range of considerations including
strategic assessments of the likely reactions of foreign governments. Neither
in terms of the capacity to make such judgments nor in terms of the range of
instruments of persuasion which can be brought to bear are the courts well
placed to deal with such issues. The outcome of direct government-togovernment negotiations will on average be more satisfactory.
It is important to distinguish between one's objectives and the best way to
achieve them. The case for not applying U.S. antitrust laws to the actions of
foreign firms outside of the United States rests on the issue of enforceability.
Contrary to the views expressed by Ordover, Atwood's argument opposing
the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws against national cartels abroad does not
logically imply that there should be "mutual forbearance among trading
nations with respect to their home-grown export cartels."' 0 Rather, it reflects
8. For evaluations of alternative strategies toward foreign monopoly, see Dreyer, Countervailing
Foreign Use of Monopoly Power, in CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 317 (R.
Amacher, G. Haberler & T. Willett eds. 1979) (includes commentaries by Holzman, Tollison, Caves,
Diaz-Alejandro, Shields, and Tower). See also Tower, Making the Best Use of Trade Restrictions in the
Presence of Foreign Market Power, 15 J. INT'L ECON. 349 (1983). For specific discussion of policies
toward OPEC, see Willett, Oil Import Quotas Are \,ot theAnswer, J. ENERGY & DEV. 240 (1976); Willett,
The Structure of OPEC and the Outlook for International Oil Prices, 2 WORLD ECON. 51 (1979); Willet,
Conflict and Cooperation in OPEC: Some Additional Economic Considerations, 33 INT'L ORG. (1979).
9. Atwood, Conflicts of Jurisprudence in the Antitrust Field. The Example of Export Cartels, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 162.
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the difficulty of using national antitrust laws as a method of dealing with the
problem.
Atwood's logic falters when he proposes distinguishing between national
and international export cartels for the purpose of enforcing U.S. antitrust
policies. While the latter type of cartel presents far more serious problems,
the problems of effective enforcement continue to apply. There may be more
concern about OPEC than the French wine cartel, but in both cases national
antitrust laws fail to provide an effective response. In each case, the most
desirable outcome would be effective international legal agreements
prohibiting such actions. Where such agreements cannot be secured, the
United States is left with direct negotiation and bargaining as the best
approach in most circumstances.
IV
HARD VERSUS SOFT INTERNATIONAL LAW'

There exists an argument for passing some laws and adopting some
agreements even though it is known that they have no effective enforcement
mechanism. Such "soft" international law can be seen as enunciating
principles or objectives which generate moral suasion. This possibility of
moral suasion, however, must be balanced against the chances that continued
ineffectiveness of laws will breed disrespect for them. There are doubts about
Atwood's argument that his proposed enforcement stance "would help
legitimize U.S. enforcement efforts against cartels that do not meet the listed
criteria."' 12 Certainly, one can support the principle that it may often be wiser
to agree on more limited objectives which can be achieved, than to continue
to strive for a more desirable goal whose realization is unlikely. In these
terms, however, Atwood's proposal buys the United States very little.
V
ENFORCEABILITY AND DUAL JURISDICTION

Abbott's analysis of extraterritorial trade controls gives an excellent
example of the need to consider enforcement issues.' 3 Continual bargaining
is costly and the absence of clear ground rules creates uncertainty. 14 Thus,
assuming the adoption of sensible criteria, it is desirable to attempt to
negotiate strong international codes and agreements. 15 Abbott presents a
very useful discussion of the types of provisions that might form the basis for
11. For discussions of the concept of soft law, see Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of
Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983); Wijkman, Informal Svsteniic Change in the GATT, 9
WORLD ECON. 37 (1986); Farran, The Interplay of Law and Economics in International Trade Regulation, in
ISSUES IN WORLD TRADE POLICY 193 (R. Snape ed. 1986).
12. Atwood, supra note 9, at 163.
13. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial Trade Controls, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1987, at 117.
14. Id. at 146.
15. Id. at 147-48.
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an agreement between the United States and Europe on the permissible reach
of national trade controls. As a general principle, such issues should be

approached on the basis of dual jurisdiction, with the last word belonging to
the government with the more effective enforcement possibilities. Thus, in
the case of sanctions, it would be argued that it is legitimate for the United
States to apply its sanctions policies to the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms,
but that host country governments would have the right to override such
policies. This would provide a clear legal framework for government-togovernment negotiations about sanctions policies without creating additional
jurisdictional acrimony.
VI
THE DESIRABILITY OF ENFORCEABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

As is emphasized in the Coasian approach to law and economics, where
bargaining is possible, the most important factor involved in achieving
efficient outcomes is that the legal framework of "property rights" (in this
case the property right ofjurisdiction) be clearly established in an enforceable
manner. 16 Whether the right to decide is given to party A or party B, there
will be both opportunity and incentive to bargain for the most highly valued
outcome. There still would remain free-riding problems, among others,
which may cause conflict, but there would be a clear focal point for
negotiations. Following the spirit of Abbott's suggestions, it seems desirable
to provide a process whereby the initiating country's government will inform
the governments of countries where affected subsidiaries reside of its
intentions, before they are made public. The host country's government
could then inform the initiating country that it was seriously considering
overriding the initiating government's intentions before making any public
announcement. This would facilitate productive negotiations by keeping
initial public announcements from hardening either country's positions.
VII
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that while this article criticizes
some of the specifics of the papers discussed, it is heartening to see the
recognition being given to the need to combine economic, political, and legal
analyses in dealing with policy issues concerning international economic
relations. These papers make a useful contribution to the growth of this
literature.
16. The original contribution is Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For
recent applications and references to other literature applying this law-and-economics approach and
the closely related public choice approach to issues of national versus international jurisdiction and
the design of strategies to deal with international spillover, see R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN
RESOURCES (1979); Tollison & Willett, InstitutionalAlechanismsfor Dealing with InternationalExternalities:
A Public Choice Perspective, in THE LAw OF THE SEA 77 (R. Amacher & R. Sweeney eds. 1976);
Conybeare, International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights, 34 INT'L ORG. 307 (1980).

